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The degree of substitutability between social security wealth and private wealth is a much-debated topic; 
however, less time and energy has been devoted to the study of the distributive properties of a measure of 
wealth summing future pension benefits net of contributions to the other traditional components of 
households’ net worth (financial and real activities, net of liabilities). The present paper has two essential 
aims: by using six cross-sections of the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Income and Wealth (1991, 1993, 1995, 
1998, 2000 and 2002), it firstly aims to estimate an “augmented” measure of net worth incorporating social 
security wealth, and secondly it examines the composition and distribution of such augmented wealth among 
Italian households during the period 1991-2002. The result is that augmented wealth is found to have 
remained constant in real term over the last decade due to two opposing forces, namely an increase in net 
worth and a parallel, stronger decline in social security wealth, resulting from the two main pension reforms 
implemented in 1992 and 1995. Wealth inequality, after rising steeply at the beginning of the 1990s, levelled 
off during the second part of the period in question. The major contribution towards this upwards movement 
came from social security wealth, the distribution of which, although less unequal than that of real wealth 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Future social security benefits constitute a major part of total household wealth in all developed 
countries. Any analysis of the accumulation and distribution of wealth, and of its evolution over 
time, would therefore be misleading were it not to include the value of annuities expected from the 
private and public pension system. In order to take account of the effects of the pay-as-you-go 
system on wealth distribution in the US, Feldstein (1976) introduced an “augmented” definition of 
household wealth, whereby social security wealth was added to the other traditional components of 
each household’s net worth. Other studies, and in particular those by Kennickel and Sunden (1999) 
and by Wolff (1987, 2003 and 2005), further refined the analysis of the distributional effects of the 
pension system on total wealth for the United States. All of these studies concluded that social 
security wealth had a clearly mitigating effect on the distribution of total wealth, whereas the effect 
of private pension wealth was perceived as being of a more mixed nature. Recently other studies 
provided empirical evidence on the distributive properties of an augmented wealth definition in 
Canada (Shamsuddin 2001) and the United Kingdom (Banks et al. 2005). 
The main aim of this present paper is to estimate an augmented definition of wealth for Italian 
households, in order to evaluate the effects of the Italian Social Security system on the distribution 
of total wealth during the period 1991-2002. Several important events during this decade render this 
analysis of particular interest: i) three structural reforms of the public pension system were 
introduced (1992, 1995 and 1997), nearly halving the aggregate value of net social security wealth, 
reducing the internal rate of return and enhancing the actuarial degree of fairness of the system. The 
reduction in social security wealth was of an uneven nature, affecting diverse cohorts and 
productive categories within Italian society to different degrees; ii) there were important changes to 
the allocation of financial activities during the course of the decade, ending in the bursting of the 
financial bubble; iii) the real component of net worth, and in particular real estate, grew steadily 
from 1992 onwards, thus counterbalancing the effect of the bursting of the financial bubble. 
The distributive effects of ii) and iii) on the net worth of Italian households have been empirically 
analysed by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000), and with particular accuracy by Brandolini et al. (2004). 
Both the latter studies base their estimations of net worth on the Bank of Italy’s “Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW). By using adjusted data from this survey’s historical 
archive for the period 1991-2002, we estimate a broader definition of household wealth which   3
includes the present value of those future pension benefits (net of payroll taxes) expected by the 
retired and active population.
1  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the 
distributive effects of social security systems on the distribution of wealth; section 3 describes the 
data sources and the accounting framework for the definition of total wealth used in this paper; this 
section also illustrates the adjustment procedures which have been followed to correct the SHIW 
microdata for non-response, non-reporting and under-reporting; section 4 presents the estimation of 
social security wealth; section 5 offers new microeconomic evidence of the composition and 
inequality of total wealth in Italy during the period 1991-2002; section 6 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Overview of recent studies  
 
The introduction and growth of public pension programs radically influences the process of saving 
and wealth accumulation. In Italy, as in the majority of developed countries, future social security 
benefits represent a substantial part of total household wealth. Since Feldstein’s study (1974), which 
introduced the concept of social security wealth for the first time, this variable has been empirically 
estimated using both aggregate and survey data. In particular the degree of substitutability between 
social security wealth and private wealth has been tested in a large number of analyses designed to 
verify the validity of the life-cycle hypothesis (for Italy studies, see Rossi and Visco 1990, Jappelli 
1995, Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003). Social security wealth measures and estimates have also 
been widely employed in political and economic debate in order to gauge the sustainability of the 
public pension system, the long-term effects of pay-as-you-go systems on public finance 
(Brugiavini and Peracchi 2004, Sartor 1999), and the effects of pension rules on labour supply 
decisions (Brugiavini and Peracchi 2003). 
Fewer studies have tried to analyse the distributive properties of social security wealth: some 
exceptions are the works by Feldstein (1976), Wolff (1987, 2003 and 2005), Mc Garry and 
Davenport (1997) and Kennickell and Sunden (1999), providing estimations of the distributive 
effects of this variable in the US. All of these studies define the total wealth of each household as 
the sum of net worth, pensions and social security wealth. According to Feldstein (1976), the 
exclusion of social security wealth would distort the real picture of the distribution of household 
wealth. In his study he uses survey data to estimate a measure of social security wealth derived from 
the current distribution of earnings in a steady-state hypothesis. He finds that total wealth in the US 
                                                 
1 We wish to thank Giovanni D’Alessio for kindly providing us with the complete series of adjusted data for real and   4
is much less concentrated after the inclusion of social security wealth. The Gini coefficient for net 
worth is 0.72, while for total wealth it is down to 0.51. Moreover, the distribution of total wealth 
among income classes is more similar to the distribution of social security wealth than to that of net 
worth. Wolff (1987) shows that social security wealth has a pronounced equalising effect on the 
distribution of total wealth. He simulates the lifetime wealth distribution of the US population and 
finds that private pension wealth is less equally distributed than disposable wealth, but its 
magnitude is very low. In contrast, the inclusion of social security wealth produces a marked 
reduction in measured wealth distribution. The Gini coefficient decreases from 0.73 to between 0.49 
and 0.60. This marked reduction in inequality can be explained by the fact that social security 
wealth is much more evenly distributed than disposable wealth, and its magnitude is very close to 
that of traditional household wealth. Kennickel and Sunden (1999) also find that social security 
wealth constitutes a substantial part of total wealth, and its introduction has had an equalising effect 
on US wealth distribution. In particular, they show that the bottom 90% of the population hold the 
overwhelmingly proportion of social security wealth, whereas the top 0.5% owns 45% of business 
assets and 30% of traded corporate stocks. Gustmann et al. (1997) estimate that pensions, social 
security wealth and health insurance account for half of the wealth held by all households with an 
average age of between 51 and 61. In a more recent paper, Wolff (2005) estimates distributive 
trends for various measures of wealth which show that the inclusion of social security wealth results 
in a marked reduction in the Gini coefficient for total wealth, from 0.826 to 0.665 in 2001. This 
reflects both the lower level of inequality in social security wealth than in marketable wealth, as 
well as its relatively low correlation to net worth. Over a 19-year period (1983-2001) the equalising 
effect of social security wealth decreased. Recently the idea to estimate an augmented measure of 
wealth has been used outside the US. For example Banks et al. (2005) provide a detailed 
reconstruction of such a variable for people aged between 50 and the state pension age for the UK. 
They find that state pension wealth is more equally distributed than private pension wealth. 
Moreover according to their estimation pension wealth and non-pension wealth do not act as 
substitutes for each other. Finally the composition of total wealth varies considerably across the 
wealth distribution. 
Relatively few studies have empirically explored wealth distribution in Italy (Cannari and 
D’Alessio 1994, Jappelli and Pistaferri 2000, Brandolini et al. 2004, Faiella and Neri 2004). To our 
knowledge, none of these studies includes an estimate of social security wealth and its redistributive 
impact. Cannari and D’Alessio (1994) examine household wealth inequality using the 1991 SHIW, 
and show that at the beginning of the last decade, the proportion of net worth (defined as the total 
                                                                                                                                                                  
financial wealth used in this paper.   5
market value of dwellings, consumer durables and financial assets, net of debts) held by the richest 
decile amounted to 39%, while the corresponding figure for the poorest decile was a mere 0.2%. 
Using data drawn from four cross-sections (1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995) of the Bank of Italy’s 
SHIW, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) characterise the static and dynamic features of wealth 
distribution, and compare them with consumption and income inequality. They distinguish between 
net worth and financial wealth, where the former is defined as the sum of households’ financial 
assets and real net assets. The authors find that wealth distributions are by far more right-skewed 
and dispersed than the corresponding distributions for consumption and disposable income: net 
worth and financial wealth displayed Gini indexes of 0.59 and 0.70 respectively in 1995, as opposed 
to scores of 0.30 and 0.36 for consumption and disposable income. Examining wealth distribution 
by income deciles, they also discover that both mean and median wealth monotonically increase 
with the household’s ranking in the income distribution table, implying a strong correlation between 
the relative positions of the two distributions. Finally, the transition matrices for net worth and 
financial wealth in 1993 and 1995 show a relatively limited degree of wealth mobility, with slightly 
less immobility in the distribution of financial wealth. Using the SHIW historical archive, 
Brandolini et al. (2004) have more recently investigated the composition and distribution of wealth 
among Italian households, together with its evolution from 1989 to 2000. They find that wealth 
distribution is a lot more unequal than income distribution: in 2000 the Gini index was 0.61 for net 
worth, compared with 0.37 for disposable income. The corresponding values of the Gini index for 
the main components of net worth were 0.60 for real assets, compared with a much higher value of 
0.81 for financial assets. Wealth inequality declined from 1989 to 1991 and then rose considerably 
during the rest of the decade, due mainly to the large gains made at the very top of the distribution. 
In particular, a substantial part of the increase in net worth inequality was traceable to financial 
assets, which have both increased their weight in portfolios and become more heavily concentrated. 
Based on the SHIW and the Survey of Consumer Finances (Federal Reserve Board), Faiella and 
Neri (2004) compare Italian and American households’ wealth in 1998. They find that tangible 
assets are the main wealth component in both countries. In the US households hold a higher share of 
financial assets and show a greater propensity to invest in more diversified and risky portfolios. 
American households also have a stronger tendencies to debt. In both countries the level and the 
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3.   Data sources and the accounting framework 
 
The data used in this study are taken from the 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002 Surveys of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy.
2 The sample size is about 
8,000 units per year. The survey gathers information on household microeconomic behaviour and 
on the socio-demographic characteristics of household members. The basic unit of observation is 
the “household”, defined as all persons related by blood, marriage or affection, residing under the 
same roof and pooling all or part of their incomes. Institutional population is not included. No 
allowance is made in this paper for taking account of the household size or composition: in other 
words, no equivalence scale is used.
3 The SHIW, much like all sample surveys on household 
income and wealth, suffers from a lack of response. In the six surveys used in this paper the 
response rate (net of those units not found at the address given) has been variable, and sometimes 
has been considerably low. It has ranged from a minimum of 36.1% in 2002 to a maximum of 
72.0% in 1993. Non-response in statistical surveys is obviously a matter of concern whenever it 
produces samples where the less co-operative segments of the population, usually the richer 
households, are under-represented. To limit these potentially distorting effects, each household is 
weighted by an appropriate sample weight.  
The principal concept of wealth used in this study is “augmented” wealth, which is defined as the 
sum of net worth and social security wealth (Davies and Shorrocks 2000, Wolff 2003). The first 
component of augmented wealth is net worth, which is equal to the total value of all those assets the 
household can sell in the market, less any debts.
4 According to a number of authors (Feldstein 1976, 
Wolff 1987, Jappelli and Modigliani 1998), net worth is not a satisfactory definition of wealth in 
those countries where there is a mandatory, public pension system. If contributions to a social 
security scheme are perceived by individuals as a substitute for other forms of lifecycle saving, then 
a definition of wealth which is capable of measuring the stock of resources to be used to finance 
consumption during old age, perhaps ought to consider the present value of future pension 
entitlements as well. This point is forcefully argued by Jappelli and Modigliani (1998); they point 
                                                 
2 This study does not use the last available SHIW, released in January 2006 and referred to the 2004 balance sheets of 
Italian households, since the adjustment coefficients to correct the 2004 micro-data for non-response, non-reporting and 
under-reporting are still not available. 
3 See Sierminska and Smeeding (2005) for a discussion of some definitional issues, such as the choice of the 
appropriate unit for assessment, and the equivalence scale question. 
4 Following the definition used in the SHIW, net worth is here defined as the total value of tangible assets (real estates, 
business equity and other valuables) and financial assets (transaction and saving accounts, government bonds, equities 
and other assets), net of financial liabilities (mortgages and other debts). 
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out that in any pension scheme, contributions entitle workers to receive a retirement pension, and so 
contributions should be regarded as a component of life-cycle saving. On the other hand, pension 
benefits represent the utilisation of pension wealth that was previously accumulated prior to 
retirement. It is clear that the importance of this point increases with the size of the public pension 
system and with its degree of actuarial fairness, and is not related to whether the system is funded or 
not (Lindbeck and Persson 2003). 
In the case of actuarial fairness, the measurement of social security wealth at a given time is simply 
equal to the accrued capitalised value of pension entitlements. In all other situations (i.e. when the 
pension system’s internal rate of return is different from the market interest rate), the social security 
wealth of each individual should be measured as the difference between the present value of future 
pension benefits and that one of future payroll taxes. 
Italy has a very extensive public pension system: the payroll tax is equal to 33% of gross earnings 
for employees and to 19% for the self-employed. Moreover the degree of actuarial fairness of the 
system will gradually increase as the 1995 reform is phased in. Therefore we believe that the 
definition of augmented wealth could offer a more complete description of both the level and the 
distributive properties of total wealth among Italian households. Accordingly, our definition of 
augmented or total wealth, TW, at time t can be summarised as follow: 
 
TWt = ARt + AFt – PFt + SSWNt 
 
where AR is the sum of consumer durable goods, jewellery and other valuables, real estate and 
businesses; AF is the sum of all financial assets; PF measures all debts and SSWN is the present 
value of future pension benefits net of the expected contributions to be paid from the time of 
observation until retirement. Our definition of total wealth does not include cash and currency, 
severance indemnity and the cash value of life insurance and private retirement accounts, which are 
not recorded in our data source. 
Comparisons with external sources such as the national accounts show that the quality of net worth 
estimates in the SHIW is under-reported, this being particularly so in the case of financial assets. 
According to some calculations made from the SHIW historical archives, transactions and savings 
accounts appear to have been underestimated over the last decade by an average of 64%, 
government bonds by 70%, and private bonds, company shares and investment shares by 85% 
(Brandolini  et al. 2004). The discrepancy between the SHIW estimates and the corresponding 
aggregate figures is lower, albeit still remarkable, in the case of real assets, which were 
underestimated by around 26% for the same period.   8
The discrepancies between aggregate and survey data can be accounted for on several grounds: 
firstly, by the existence of irreconcilable differences in classifications and definitions, which 
prevent micro and macro data from being fully comparable; secondly, by the difficulty of including 
in a statistically representative way the wealthiest households in the sample (selection bias), being 
wealth distribution highly concentrated; and thirdly, by interviewees’ tendency to be reticent about 
the assets they actually own (non-reporting) or to under-value their declared asset holdings (under-
reporting). 
A range of statistical techniques have been adopted in to correct for the probabilities of avoiding the 
interview (non-response), and for non-reporting and under-reporting of both financial assets and 
dwellings not occupied by their owners, in the SHIW. To correct for non-response, weights adjusted 
for differential response rates across households with different characteristics (among which income 
and wealth) have been recalculated (D’Alessio and Faiella 2002).
5 The correction for non-reporting 
and under-reporting of financial assets is based on the outcome of a statistical matching of the 1987 
SHIW with the micro-data survey carried out in the same year by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
on a sample of its customers (Cannari and D’Alessio 1993). The procedure to account for the non-
reporting of dwelling not occupied by their owners is based on the assumption that the probability 
of owning a dwelling other than one’s own residence follows a Poisson distribution. The estimates 
of this distribution have been used to impute ownership (Cannari and D’Alessio 1990). 
The correction procedures have a substantial impact on the surveys carried out in the 1990s. On 
average, the adjustments increase the mean values of real estate and financial assets by 31 and 
148%, respectively. Overall, the shortfall compared with macro sources is reduced from 75 to 39% 
for total financial assets, from 26 to 8% for real assets, and from 41 to 17% for net worth 
(Brandolini et al. 2004). Furthermore, the adjustments bring the composition of household wealth 
closer into line with aggregate evidence. However, the corrections vary considerably from one year 
to the next, and consequently so do the remaining discrepancies with respect to aggregate figures. 
Although we believe that the adjusted data are meant to provide a more realistic picture of the 
distribution of household wealth than the one implied by the raw micro data, the manipulation 
which is inevitably contained in the above mentioned corrections should recommend to interpret the 
empirical evidence which is presented in section 5 with particular care. 
 
                                                 
5 The procedures to correct for non-response is based on the assumption that households requiring at least two visits 
before accepting the interview are representative of non-responding units and on figures on the number of contacts 
needed in the 1998 SHIW to obtain the interview. Bank of Italy does not address the non-response issue through the 
over-sampling of high-income households, since a reliable list of rich households from which to get the additional units 
is not available.   9
4.  The calculation of social security wealth 
 
The survey data (SHIW) do not contain information about  social security wealth, and so the present 
section describes how we estimated this variable. Social security wealth is defined as the sum of 
expected future benefits less the sum of contributions a worker expects to pay between the time of 
observation and his/her retirement. According to this definition, at each point of time and for each 
individual, social security wealth expresses an individual’s accrued entitlements to wealth resulting 
from participation in the public pension scheme. 
For each individual present in the six surveys (1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002) we first 
computed the present value of future pension benefits. In doing so we used information about age, 
gender, occupation, seniority, expected retirement age, earnings, life expectancy and the relevant 
social security legislation in force during the year of observation. Next we estimated the present 
value of the individual’s contributions to his/her pension scheme and we net out this value from the 
current value of future benefits. Both future pensions and future contributions are discounted back 
to the year of observation in order to render the value of social security wealth comparable with 
other components of total wealth. 
Since figures for net worth are collected at the household level, we need to sum up social security 
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where N is the maximum number of individuals within the household receiving a pension, p is the 
expected year of retirement of individual j, d is the life expectancy at retirement of individual j, Bj is 
the pension benefit received by individual j upon retirement, r is the discount rate, i is the real 
annual growth of the pension benefit, ck is the payroll tax rate at year k and Wk,j is gross wage at 
year k for individual j. 
The estimation of social security wealth necessarily involves numerous approximations together 
with the use of a series of hypotheses, all of which we shall be looking at in the next part of this 
section. In particular, we have adopted the following hypotheses: 
1.  we express all social security wealth values in 2002 constant Euros, and we assume perfect 
foresight regarding future inflation and a complete price-indexation mechanism;   10
2.  we assume that workers have full knowledge of the pension rules; 
3.  there are two forms of reasoning leading individuals to retire: either they have a sufficient 
number of years of pension contributions to access a seniority pension, and thus they leave 
the job immediately; or they exit the labour market when they reach the legal retirement age; 
4.  life expectancies used for the computation of social security wealth are taken from 
forecasted survival estimations furnished by the National Statistical Office (Istat); 
5.  lifetime earnings used to compute future pension benefits and future contributions are 
estimated in terms of gender, of three different levels of education, and for employees and 
the self-employed separately; 
6.  a constant rate of growth of gross wages and a discount rate, respectively equal to 1.5 and 
2.5%, are assumed; 
7.  indexation of pensions only corresponded to earnings growth in 1991. Thereafter, pensions 
for each individual have been kept constant in real terms. 
 
 
4.1 Earnings  profiles 
 
The estimation of lifetime earnings is particularly important because the calculation of the level of 
pension benefit has gradually shifted from a final-salary formula (adopted in 1991) to a lifetime-
earnings formula (1992), and then to a contribution-related formula (after 1995). We have estimated 
9 stylised profiles of lifetime earnings obtained from a combination of gender, education (three 
levels - primary, secondary and tertiary) and employment status (employee or self-employed).  
The income figures from the surveys are net of personal income tax, and so we grossed up net 
incomes using the following procedure : by defining YNi and YLi as the net income and the gross 
income of individual i, respectively, his/her gross income is calculated by solving the following 
equation: 
) 1 (
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where: 
Yj  =  the upper limit of personal income tax bracket j; 
tj  =  the marginal tax rate of income bracket j; 
Di =  tax  credit; 
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We computed gross earnings for the 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002 surveys by taking 
account of those changes in the personal income tax law made during the period in question. 
Earnings profiles by gender, occupation and educational level are obtained as a result of regressing 
the logarithm of gross earnings on a third degree polynomial on age. The shape of earnings profiles 
for different occupations, gender and educational levels are observed in figures 1 and 2, where we 
plot the estimated value of the log of income against age. Nominal gross wages for each worker are 
then calculated on the basis of the appropriate regression coefficients, taking into account a constant 
annual real growth rate of 1.5%. 
 
Figure 1 
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Gross wage profiles are then used to estimate the lifetime path of contributions and to compute 
pension benefits. We assume continuous career with the likely effect to overestimate the social 
security wealth. The age of an individual at his/her first year of participation in the labour market is 
exogenously defined according to the education level: respectively 20, 25 and 30 years for primary, 
secondary and tertiary level. 
 
 
4.2  Computation of pension benefits 
 
It is not the aim of this subsection to give a detailed description of all the changes introduced in the 
pension law from 1992 to 2002.
6 The reforms of the nineties have tackled several aspects of the 
system, changing retirement age and eligibility criteria, benefits computation and indexation rules. 
In particular the 1992 reform modified the indexation of pension benefits, increased the legal 
retirement age and made less generous the earning related formula used to compute pension 
benefits. The 1995 reform introduced a contribution related formula making the Italian social 
security system almost actuarially fair. The 1997 introduced important rules in order to restrict 
eligibility criteria for people who wanted to anticipate retirement with respect to the legal age. A 
very slow transitional path to the new system characterized all reforms, making effective changes 
very slow to enter in action: in particular in 1992 pensioners and workers with more than 15 years 
of contributions were nearly not affected by the reform, with the exception of the change in the 
indexation rule, which affected all present and future pensioners. 
In order to take account of the effects of the reforms we split our sample data into different groups 
according to occupational status and seniority during the year in which the individual from the 
sample was observed. Firstly, we isolated retired people: pensions are not calculated for this group, 
since SHIW surveys report the net value of pension benefits received. In order to maintain a degree 
of homogeneity with the estimated values of future pension benefits for the active population, we 
grossed up net pension benefits by following the same procedure described in the previous 
subsection. The active population was split into four different groups according to seniority accrued 
in 1992. In particular, the first group comprised all individuals from the 1991 survey, as no reform 
had been enacted yet in 1991. The second group comprised all workers with at least 15 years of 
contributions in 1992. The third group comprised all workers with less than 15 years of 
contributions in 1992. The fourth group consisted of all those workers who entered the labour 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 For a description of the Italian social security system see for example Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (2004) or 
Franco (2002).   13
market after 1995. In each of the four groups, employees and the self-employed were analysed 
separately.  
The first year pension benefit is then computed as a weighted average of various different 
components. Pension benefits for those individuals in the first and the second groups were 
calculated as follows: 
 
) ( * 2 2 1 1 W N W N r PA + =  
where: 
r = 0.02, N1 and N2 are the number of years of contributions paid in before and after 1992, W1 and 
W2 are pensionable earnings before and after 1992. 
Pension benefits for individuals in the fourth group are computed according to the contribution 
related formula introduced after 1995: 
MC k PB * =  
where: 
k is the legal transformation coefficient and MC is the capitalised value of career contributions with 
a real rate of return of 1.5%. Finally, pension benefits for individuals in the third group were 
computed as a weighted average of PA and PB, the weights, β and (1-β), being given, respectively, 
by the ratio between the number of years of contributions made by the individual before and after 
the 1995 reform, and the total number of working years: 
( ) B A c P P P β β − + = 1 
A synthesis of the rules used for the computation of pension benefits is reported in the appendix. 
 
 
5.  The composition and inequality of total household wealth: microeconomic evidence 
 
Having drawn up a broad definition of household wealth with an incorporated social security 
component, this section presents a series of new estimates of the composition and distribution of 
total wealth in Italy during the period 1991-2002. Our analysis is based on the data sets of the last 
six surveys by the SHIW Historical Archive of the Bank of Italy. 
Median total wealth of an Italian household was about 19% lower in 2002 than in 1991, as the first 
row in Table 1 shows. However, the decline in real terms was not a continuous one. In fact, after 
falling by 23% between 1991 and 1998, median total wealth rose by 6% from 1998 to 2002. Median 
disposable income displayed a similar trend, with a 5.2% fall during the first half of the decade, a 
subsequent 10% recovery by 1998, and substantial stability thereafter. Mean total wealth was higher   14
than the median, and it experienced a much less pronounced variation during the course of the 
decade. In fact, after falling by 11% between 1991 and 1995, mean total wealth went back to the 
original levels by the end of the 1990s. 
 
Table 1 
Mean and Median Household Wealth, 1991-2002 (at 2002 prices in thousands of euro) 
 
  1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 %  Change 
1991-2002 
   Total wealth         
Median   325.1 269.6 255.8 249.4 252.0  264.6  -18.6 
Mean 419.9 382.3 373.4 404.0 420.2  422.0  0.5 
Percent with zero or negative values  0.0 1.4 3.0 3.1 3.2  3.6   
      
   Real and financial assets*      
Median   134.0 140.4 134.2 129.4 135.2  143.6  7.2 
Mean 222.3 242.2 239.4 270.2 284.7  284.5  28.0 
Percent with zero or negative values  0.5 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6  1.5   
      
   Social security wealth      
Median   157.9 100.6 89.9 88.3 90.9  94.3  -40.3 
Mean 197.5 140.1 133.9 133.8 135.6  137.5  -30.4 
Percent with zero or negative values  13.2 19.6 22.4 21.1 20.7  21.0   
      
   Disposable income**      
Median 23.0 21.3 21.8 24.0 23.6  23.3  1.3 
Mean 26.9 26.1 26.7 28.6 28.7  28.3  5.2 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
Median and mean values are expressed at 2002 prices calculated using the consumer price index. 
(*) Net of financial liabilities. 
(**) Total household income net of taxes and social security contributions. 
 
The time trend for median total wealth is the product of two opposing tendencies; on the one hand, 
a 7% increase in real and financial assets, and on the other, a stronger fall in social security wealth, 
with an almost 41% fall in the median figure. The reduction in social security wealth appears to be 
mainly concentrated between 1991 and 1995. This reduction may be explained by the abolition of 
the indexation of pensions to real wage growth after 1991, involving all current and future 
pensioners, together with the changes in the computation of pension benefits introduced by the 1992 
and 1995 reforms, which was to chiefly affect young workers and the self-employed. Due to its 
sharp fall, social security wealth, which accounted for almost half of wealth owned by Italian 
households in 1991, represented less than one third of total wealth by the beginning of the current 
decade. The rise in net worth is largely attributable to the increase in home-ownership and dwelling 
size, the exceptional rise in house prices, the substantial shift in household portfolios towards 
higher-risk assets, and the remarkable increase in stock market prices during the late 1990s. It is   15
noticeable to consider the increasing share of households with zero or even negative values in social 
security wealth, from 13.2% in 1991 to 21.0% in the last survey. 
A detailed breakdown by various different percentiles of wealth distribution is shown in Table 2. In 
2002, the top 1% of all families owned 12% of total household wealth; the top 20% of households 
held 57%. By focussing on the two components of total wealth, we estimated that the richest 
quintile owned 62% of real and financial assets, and 46% of social security wealth.  
 
Table 2 
Distribution of Household Wealth, 1991-2002 
 
Year  Percentage Share of Total Wealth and its components held by 
 
  Top 1%  Next 4%  Next 5%  Next 10%  Top 20%  2
nd 20%  3
rd 20%  Bottom 
40% 
Total      
wealth 
        
1991 6.2  11.9 12.3 17.4 47.9 24.5 15.2 12.4 
1993 8.2  14.2 11.5 16.3 50.2 23.2 15.3 11.2 
1995 8.6  14.1 11.7 17.5 52.0 22.6 14.9 10.5 
1998 14.4 14.6 12.0 16.0 57.0 19.8 13.5  9.8 
2000 15.5 15.4 10.5 15.2 56.6 20.5 13.1  9.8 




        
1991 9.3  14.6 13.5 16.5 53.9 23.0 13.0 10.1 
1993 11.1 16.3 12.2 15.9 55.4 21.2 13.6  9.8 
1995 11.3 16.3 12.0 16.7 56.2 20.3 13.2 10.3 
1998 19.8 16.2 12.2 14.8 63.1 16.5 11.4  9.0 
2000 21.4 17.6 10.1 13.6 62.7 17.3 11.1  9.0 




     
1991 2.8  8.9  11.0 18.4 41.1 26.1 17.7 15.1 
1993 3.2  10.6 10.4 17.1 41.3 26.6 18.3 13.8 
1995 3.7  10.4 11.2 19.1 44.4 26.8 18.0 10.8 
1998 3.5  11.2 11.6 18.5 44.8 26.3 17.7 11.3 
2000 3.0  11.0 11.4 18.6 44.0 27.2 17.3 11.5 
2002 3.2  12.0 11.9 18.7 45.8 25.6 17.9 10.7 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures.  
In order to calculate percentile shares, households were ranked according to their total wealth. 
 
 
The figures show that total wealth inequality, while rising steeply at the beginning of the 1990s, 
substantially levelled off during the second half of the decade. For example, the share of total 
wealth held by the top 1% rose from an initial figure of 6.2% in 1991 to 8.6% in 1995, before 
remaining stable around 14-15% for the rest of the decade and decreasing in 2002. The share of   16
total wealth held by the richest quintile showed a monotonically increasing trend, from 48% in 1991 
to 57% in 2002. At the other extreme of the distribution range, the share of total wealth held by the 
bottom two quintiles was considerably reduced, falling from 12.4% in 1991 to 9.6% at the end of 
the period. A similar trend characterised the inequality in the distribution of real and financial 
assets. For example, the share held by the top 1% grew from an initial 9.3% to 21.4% in 2000, 
before falling to 16% in 2002. This trend is probably due to the strong increase in stock market 
prices during the late 1990s and the subsequent fall at the beginning of this decade which, first, 
benefitted and, then, hurt the richest percentile. 
Not surprisingly, given that social security wealth is essentially correlated with lifetime distribution 
of earnings, it appears concentrated to a smaller degree than real and financial wealth are. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the share of social security wealth held by the top 1% “only” amounted to 
2.8%, while the figure for the corresponding percentile with regard to the distribution of real and 
financial wealth was 9.3%. The same was true of the shares held by the next top 4% of the richest 
decile of the two distributions. 
The pension reforms implemented in the nineties seem to have reduced the equalising effect of 
social security wealth on total wealth. In fact, the percentage of social security wealth accruing to 
the bottom 40% of the distribution considerably fell, from 15.1 to 10.7%. 
Table 3, showing the Gini index for total household wealth and its components, substantially 
confirms the previously-mentioned picture. There was a substantial rise in total wealth inequality 
during the last decade, from 44% to 57%, followed only by a slight downwards shift at the 
beginning of the next one. The major contribution to this upwards trend came from social security 
wealth, whose distribution widened during the first part of the decade at a much faster pace than 
that of real assets and financial assets. In particular, the Gini index for social security wealth rose by 
around fourteen percentage points, from 47% in 1991 to 61% in 1995. It remained roughly stable 
thereafter until 2002. Net worth shows a much less sustained increase in the Gini index even though 
the dynamics of the financial component displays a remarkable increase of 12 percentage points. 
Table 3 also shows the trend in disposable income inequality. It is worthwhile to note that the trend 
for income is partially different from that one displayed by wealth. In fact, disposable income 
inequality, after rising steeply between 1991 and 1998, from 32.4% to 38.8%, returned at the end of 
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Table 3 
Gini Index for Total Household Wealth, its Components and for Disposable Income 
 
  1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 
   Total wealth  44.2 50.1 52.1 56.8 57.4 55.7 
        
   Real and financial assets*  56.6 59.2 59.7 65.4 65.6 63.1 
Real  assets  60.9 63.1 61.9 63.5 62.4 62.1 
Financial  assets  67.4 69.7 72.9 81.0 82.9 79.1 
Financial  liabilities  92.5 92.0 91.6 93.1 93.5 92.6 
        
   Social security wealth  47.4 56.2 61.4 62.1 61.7 61.1 
        
  Disposable Income**  32.4 35.1 35.8 38.8 35.6 33.1 
 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
(*) Net of financial liabilities. 
(**) Total household income net of taxes and social security contributions. 
 
To explore whether our inequality estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of extreme observations, 
we recalculated Gini indexes for 1991 and 2002 first excluding the largest observations in each of 
the wealth distribution and, second, excluding the top and bottom percentile groups: see Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Sensitivity of Gini Index to different treatments of extreme values: 1991 and 2002 
 
  Total Wealth  Net Worth  Social Security Wealth 
All observations (as in 
Table 3) 
    
1991 44.2  56.6  47.4 
2002 55.7  63.1  61.1 
            % increase  26.0  11.5  28.9 
      
Drop richest one       
1991 44.2  56.6  47.3 
2002 55.4  62.8  61.1 
            % increase  25.3  10.9  29.2 
      
Trim Top and Bottom 1%       
1991 41.2  53.2  46.1 
2002 50.9  57.7  59.7 
            % increase  23.5  8.4  29.5 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
 
In the first case, the total wealth Ginis for 1991 and 2002 were, respectively, 44.2% and 55.4%. 
Thus removal of the largest observation had very little impact on the Gini, and on its change over 
time. The robustness of Ginis holds even when they were calculated with respect to each of the 
wealth component (net worth and social security wealth). Removing the top and bottom 1% of the 
distributions had a more substantial effect on the estimates. In this case, the estimated Ginis for total   18
wealth were 41.2% for 1991 and 50.9% for 2002, implying an increase in the index of only 23.5% 
(compared to 26% if estimated on all observations). It is interesting to notice that trimming the top 
and the bottom percentiles had a smaller impact on the inequality estimates of social security wealth 
than on the inequality estimates of net worth. Apparently, the tails of net worth distribution are 
longer than their counterparts of social security wealth distribution. 
Tables 5a-5c display the Gini index trend for the three measures of wealth used in this study by age 
of the head of the household. Figures show that, during the period in question total wealth 
inequality increased among middle-aged and, above all, among the elderly households, whose Gini 
indexes advanced, respectively, by 8 and 22 points: from 42.8% to 51.1% among the former, and 
from 37.7% to 59.5% among the latter. The exception is young households, for whom Gini 
coefficient firstly increased, from 45.8% in 1991 to 55.9% in 1998, and then fall to 43.2% at the end 
of the period. The trend of inequality by age class for net worth seems to mirror rather closely that 
one for total wealth, while a different picture emerges with respect to the age class inequality for 
social security wealth. In fact, the strongest increase in social security wealth inequality took place 




Gini index for Total Wealth by Age Class 
 
Year  Less than 46  From 46 to 60  More than 60 
1991 45.8%  42.8%  37.7% 
1993 46.1%  49.3%  49.6% 
1995 50.6%  50.0%  50.3% 
1998 55.9%  54.3%  51.5% 
2000 52.6%  54.9%  56.8% 
2002 43.2%  51.1%  59.5% 




Gini index for Net Worth by Age Class 
 
Year  Less than 46  From 46 to 60  More than 60 
1991 60.2%  55.2%  50.5% 
1993 55.2%  58.5%  60.6% 
1995 55.6%  59.3%  60.6% 
1998 61.2%  65.5%  62.6% 
2000 57.6%  65.3%  67.2% 
2002 48.7%  61.2%  67.6% 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
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Table 5c 
Gini index for Social Security Wealth by Age Class 
 
Year  Less than 46  From 46 to 60  More than 60 
1991 44.1%  46.5%  42.5% 
1993 55.5%  54.3%  51.4% 
1995 79.1%  56.1%  51.2% 
1998 83.7%  54.1%  48.8% 
2000 77.9%  53.8%  52.9% 
2002 72.7%  51.7%  57.7% 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
 
Figures 3a-3b give a graphical picture of changes in the distribution of total wealth between 1991 
and 2002. In particular, figure 1a is a way of depicting the distribution of total wealth similar to that 
one suggested by Pen (1971). The device used is to imagine a parade in which every person (in our 
case, every wealth unit) marches past in an hour and where her/his height in the parade corresponds 
to her/his total wealth. The attraction of Pen’s Parade is that it not only brings out the relative 
positions of different people, but also allows one to identify who appears where in the distribution. 
Figures 1a excludes the two tails of the distribution (the 5% poorest and the 5% richest) in order to 
highlight the extent of differences in total wealth for the remaining part of the population. 
The Pen’s Parades of total wealth for 1991 and 2002, as shown in Figure 3a, are similar in shape, 
except that the wealthy households (the tall and the real giants in Pen’s jargon) became somewhat 
richer over the eleven year period, relative to the majority of other households. Figure 1b displays 
percentage changes in total wealth, which are negative for the majority of people, rising 
monotonically with the percentile level, from around -90% at the 5
th percentile to 18% at the 95
th 
percentile. The crossover point occurs at the 80
th percentile, with households above this point 
enjoying positive gains and those at or below this point suffering losses.   20
Figure 3a 
Total wealth in 2002 Euro by Total Wealth Percentile, 
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The pattern of distributional changes in total wealth between 1991 and 2002 is the product of the 
changes which take place in the distributions of net worth and social security wealth. The 
distributional pattern in net worth, as shown in Figures 3c-3d, shows percentages losses for the first 
quintile and percentage gains at or above the 20
th percentile, where the percentage increase remain 
relatively flat between the 35
th and 85
th percentile, at around 17%, and then rise to 32% at the 95
th 
percentile. It is of note that, differently from what happened for total wealth, the crossover point for 
net worth occurs quite close to the left tail of the distribution, at around the 20
th percentile. 
Figures 3e-3f give a picture of changes in the distribution of social security wealth between 1991 
and 2002. In fact, the pattern is quite dramatic, showing percentage losses for all percentiles. In 
particular, the losses imply negative values of social security wealth in 2002 for the households up 
to the 10
th percentile, and zero values for those belonging to the second decile. Percentage losses for 
the remaining part of the distribution decrease monotonically with the percentile level, ranging from 
around 70% at the 25
th percentile to 16% at the 95
th percentile.   22
Figure 3c 
Net worth in 2002 Euro by Net Worth Percentile, 
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Figure 3e 
Social Security Wealth in 2002 Euro by Social Security Wealth Percentile, 
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An alternative way of presenting data about household wealth distribution is through the Lorenz 
curve, which indicates the share of wealth that is received by the bottom x% of wealth units. Lorenz 
curves for Italian total wealth, net worth and social security wealth are shown in Figure 4a, 4b and 
4c. The comparison of Lorenz curves for, respectively, total wealth, net worth and social security 
wealth at the beginning and at the end of the period suggest that wealth inequality increased 
unambiguously between 1991 and 2002: in fact, the two curves for each definition of wealth do not 
intersect. Since the Lorenz curves do not cross, it can be argued that the same inequality ordering is 
confirmed not only by a comparison in terms of Gini index, as previously shown in Table 3, but 
also by all standard relative inequality indices, namely all measures satisfying anonymity, scale 
independence, the strong principle of transfers, and population replication (Atkinson 1970, Foster 
1985). 
As far as our Lorenz curve comparison is concerned, it is worthwhile to remind that the curves take 
a non-standard shape.
7 In fact, even though the mean value of each definition of wealth (total 
wealth, net worth and social security wealth) is positive, the wealth hold by the poorest households 
is sometimes zero or negative: therefore the Lorenz curve has a negative slope, lying below the 
horizontal axis, over the ranges of negative wealth values, and is horizontal, in correspondence to 
the population subgroup that has zero wealth. In particular, the 2002 and 1991 Lorenz curves for 
social security wealth hang beneath the horizontal axis up to, respectively, the poorest 31% and 
13% of the population. The same applies for the 2002 and 1991 Lorenz curves for net worth, which 
hang beneath the horizontal axis up to, respectively, the poorest 5% and 3% of the population. 
                                                 
7 On the particular features of wealth distributions that make empirical analysis non-standard in several ways, see 
Jenkins and Jäntti (2005).   25
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Table 6 analyses the composition of total household wealth and its components. In 1991, social 
security wealth was the relative most important household asset, accounting for about 47% of total 
wealth, as shown in table 4. The second largest asset was real estate, representing 32% of total 
wealth, followed by transactions and saving account (6.9%) and government bonds (5.6%). 
Financial liabilities were negligible at round 1% of total wealth. The two most striking changes that 
took place between 1991 and 2002 were the fall in social security wealth to 33%, and the rise in real 
estate to 39%.  
Table 6 
Composition of Total Household Wealth 
 
 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000  2002 
Real assets  36.9 44.1 43.9 41.2 41.5 45.6 
Real estate  32.0 37.6 38.5 35.6 35.9  39.3 
Business  equity  3.9 5.8 4.5 4.8 4.6 5.0 
Valuables  1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.3 
        
Financial assets  16.7 20.1 21.1 26.4 27.1 22.8 
Transactions  and  saving  accounts  6.9 7.9 7.8 6.6 7.7 7.4 
Government  bonds  5.6 6.4 6.4 2.9 2.5 2.4 
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds 4.2  5.8  6.9  16.9 16.9  13.0 
        
Financial liabilities  0.6 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.0 
        
Real and financial assets*  52.9 63.3 64.1 66.9 67.7 67.4 
        
Social security wealth  47.1 36.7 35.9 33.1 32.3 32.6 
    Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
     (*) Net of financial liabilities. 
 
The ratio of financial assets to total wealth increased from 16.7% in 1991 to 22.8% in 2002, 
reaching a peak of 27.1% in 2000 before the bursting of the financial bubble. Figures show that 
households have replaced government bonds with riskier investments such as equities, private 
bonds and mutual funds, whose share on total wealth in the decade went up from 4.2% to 13%. 
There are considerable differences in household portfolios, depending on the level of wealth. Tables 
7 and 8 provide a breakdown in terms of the top 1% of households, the next 19% and the bottom 
80%, at the beginning of the period and then at the end. 
In 1991 the richest 1% of households invested about 41% of their savings in real estate, and 19% in 
private bonds, equities and mutual funds. Social security wealth accounted for 21% of total wealth. 
Among the next 19% of households, 43% of their wealth took the form of social security wealth, 
while real estate accounted for 34%. The role of social security wealth was even more pronounced 
in the case of the bottom 80% of the population, as it accounted for some 53% of their total wealth. 
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Table 7 
Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class in 1991 
 
  All Households Top 1% Next 19%  Bottom 80%
   Real assets  36.9 48.1  39.7 33.3 
Real estate   32.0  40.5  34.1  29.3 
Business equity  3.9  6.2  4.9  2.8 
Valuables 1.0  1.4  0.7  1.2 
       
   Financial assets  16.7 30.9  17.5 14.4 
Transactions and saving accounts  6.9  5.0  6.1  7.8 
Government bonds  5.6  7.0  6.6  4.6 
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds 4.2  18.9  4.7  2.0 
        
Financial liabilities  0.6 0.2  0.4 0.9 
        
   Real and financial assets*  52.9 78.8  56.8 46.8 
       
   Social security wealth  47.1 21.2  43.2 53.2 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
(*) Net of financial liabilities. 
 
Table 8 
Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class in 2002 
 
  All Households Top 1% Next 19%  Bottom 80%
   Real assets  45.6 41.7  45.8 46.5 
Real estate   39.3  31.6  38.2  42.6 
Business equity  5.0  7.5  6.6  2.7 
Valuables 1.3  2.5  1.0  1.3 
       
   Financial assets  22.8 49.7  23.7 14.5 
Transactions and saving accounts  7.4  10.3  6.6  7.3 
Government bonds  2.4  3.5  2.2  2.4 
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds 13.0  35.8  14.9  4.8 
        
Financial liabilities  1.0 0.2  0.5 1.8 
        
   Real and financial assets*  67.4 91.1  69.1 59.2 
       
   Social security wealth  32.6 8.9  30.9  40.8 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
(*) Net of financial liabilities. 
 
 
Eleven years later the picture was rather different. Social security wealth accounted for a smaller 
share of total wealth for all categories, while the weight of real estate rose sharply in the case of all 
percentiles of the distribution with the exception of the richest one. The growing weight of net 
worth was particularly evident in the top 1%, where the two items underlying the substantial 
increase in the share in real and financial assets were transaction and saving accounts, and, above 
all, risky financial assets (private bonds, equities and mutual funds).   28
Figure 5 shows the ratio of net worth, social security wealth and total wealth (by age class) to the 
overall mean of the corresponding variable (1991, 1995 and 2002). Cross-sectional data such as 
those presented here do not enable us to draw up a true life-cycle profile because of the 
simultaneous presence of age, time and cohort effects. Notwithstanding this limitation, figures show 
that at the beginning of the decade, the net worth held by elderly households (aged 65 and over) 
amounted to approximately 90% of the overall mean. In the same year, the peak value of net worth 
(almost 1.3) was reached by the 55-64 age-group. From 1991 to 2002 younger age groups saw their 
ratio drop from 60 to around 50%. If we now consider the age distribution of social security wealth, 
we see that the changes which took place during the decade were much more significant. In 1991 
the younger households’ ratio was approximately equal to 0.5. The same ratio reached a peak (1.4) 
for the 55-64 age group and decreased thereafter. The picture was rather different after 
implementation of the two pension reforms, which particularly affected younger generations, 
especially those aged below 34 who saw their ratio fall to around 0.1 in 1995 and in 2002. The very 
slow transition to the new pension system at the same time produced a relative improvement for 
adult generations, and in particular for those aged between 55 and 64. The shifts in the distribution 
of social security wealth over the past decade have also affected the changes in the ratio of mean 
total wealth by age class to overall mean (see the lower part of Figure 5).   29
Figure 5 
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In order to evaluate the role played by the various components of total wealth on its overall 
variability we computed a decomposition of Gini index as in Pyatt, Chen and Fei (1980). The Gini 
index G(w) of total wealth w can be expressed as follows:  
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where wk are the components of total wealth (real assets, financial assets, financial liabilities and 
social security wealth), G(wk) represents the Gini index for the k component and R(w, wk) is the 
correlation coefficient among ranks: 
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where cov( ) is the covariance between the k component of total wealth and r(x), which shows the 
rank of the household according to w and wk. 
While in 1991 total wealth concentration basically depended on both real assets and social security 
wealth (whose relative contribution amounted around to 40-41%), a different picture emerged a 
decade later, where real assets maintained a primary role (44.2%) and the relative contribution of 
social security wealth became smaller (28.4%). Another component of total wealth, financial assets, 
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acquired a considerable weight (27.6%) in explaining total variability. Financial liabilities are the 
most concentrated component of total wealth both at the beginning and the end of the period but 
their relative contribution to the overall inequality is negligible, since their (negative) share of total 
wealth is of very little size. 
Since Gini index is not exactly decomposable, the value obtained by the decomposition, namely the 
sum of absolute contributions, might differ from that one shown in the last row of column (b). In 
fact, this is the case for 2002. 
 
Table 9 
Inequality Decomposition of Total Wealth. 1991 and 2002 
(percentage values) 
 
  Decomposition of the Gini Index 

















1991        
Real Assets   0.37  0.61  0.82  0.18  41.4 
Financial Assets   0.17  0.67  0.74  0.08  18.7 
Financial Liabilities   -0.01  0.93  0.21  -0.001  -0.3 
Social Security Wealth   0.47  0.47  0.80  0.18  40.1 
Total Wealth   1.00  0.44  -  0.44  100.0 
          
          
2002        
Real Assets   0.46  0.62  0.86  0.25  44.2 
Financial Assets   0.23  0.79  0.85  0.15  27.6 
Financial Liabilities   -0.01  0.93  0.13  -0.0012  -0.2 
Social Security Wealth   0.33  0.61  0.79  0.16  28.4 
Total Wealth   1.00  0.56  -  0.55  100.0 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
Since Gini index is not exactly decomposable, the value obtained by the decomposition might differ from 
that one shown in the last row of column (b). 
  
A further way to elicit those factors underlying changes in the size distribution of total wealth 
during the last decade is through the decomposition of inequality indices by homogeneous 
subgroups of the population. Our aim is to disentangle the inequality within groups from the 
inequality between groups. We used an index of the class of entropy measures, the half squared 
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where N is the total number of households, wi is the wealth of household i and µ is the mean value 
of wealth. One useful characteristic of this index is that it permits the exact decomposition of 
inequality by population subgroups even in the presence of negative values of wealth. In order to 
separate the “between” and “within” components, and at the same time to isolate the impact of the 
changes in population shares that occurred from 1991 to 2002, we have rewritten the half-squared 
















































W is the within-groups component net of variations in relative group sizes, E
B is the 
corresponding between-group component, E
P is a residual term which depurates the effects on total 
inequality caused by changes in population share, K is the number of groups into which the 
population can be divided, pk are the population weights calculated in the base year (2002), µk is the 
mean value of wealth for group k, and µ* is the total mean at fixed weights according to the formula 
µ* = Σk pk µk.  
The results of the decomposition of inequality into different population subgroups are presented in 
Table 8. The population (heads of households) has been sorted into five sociodemographic 
categories: area of residence, education, work status, age and gender. In keeping with the results 
obtained by Brandolini et al. (2004), who performed the same analysis on net worth, overall 
inequality in total wealth is mainly accounted for by the within-component, while the between-
component appears to play a marginal role. This result holds for all our partitioning. For example, 
in 2002 the differences across households, grouped by area of residence, accounted for just 1.5% of 
total inequality, while the remaining 98.5% was determined by the inequality within each single 
geographical area. The contribution of the between-group component had been even smaller in 
previous years (with the sole exception of 1995), ranging from 0.7 in 1991 to 1.2 in 2000. The 
“education” category revealed the greatest between-group inequality; however, even in this case the 
within-group component played a much greater role. 
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Table 10 
Decomposition of the Half-Squared Coefficient of Variation by Population Subgroup 
 
Year  Within-groups at fixed 
weights 
Value             Share 
Between-groups at fixed 
weights 
Value              Share 
Group relative size effect 
Value            Share 
Total 
 
Area of residence (1) 
1991 2.018 98.9 0.013  0.7  0.009  0.4  2.039 
1993 1.748 97.9 0.018  1.0  0.020  1.1  1.786 
1995 1.488 97.4 0.031  2.0  0.008  0.5  1.528 
1998 3.624 98.3 0.036  1.0  0.026  0.7  3.686 
2000 3.841 98.7 0.045  1.2  0.003  0.1  3.890 
2002 2.493 98.5 0.038  1.5  0.000  0.0  2.531 
        
Education of household head (2) 
1991 1.941 95.2 0.025  1.2  0.073  3.6  2.039 
1993 1.714 96.0 0.045  2.5  0.027  1.5  1.786 
1995 1.495 97.8 0.054  3.6 -0.021 -1.4 1.528 
1998 3.533 95.9 0.067  1.8  0.085  2.3  3.686 
2000 3.745 96.3 0.066  1.7  0.079  2.0  3.890 
2002 2.478 97.9 0.053  2.1  0.000  0.0  2.531 
        
Work status of household head (3) 
1991 2.189  107.3 0.050  2.4 -0.199 -9.8 2.039 
1993 1.729 96.8 0.048  2.7  0.009  0.5  1.786 
1995 1.507 98.6 0.042  2.7 -0.020 -1.3 1.528 
1998 3.616 98.1 0.068  1.8  0.003  0.1  3.686 
2000 3.827 98.4 0.037  1.0  0.026  0.7  3.890 
2002 2.474 97.7 0.057  2.3  0.000  0.0  2.531 
        
Age of household head (4) 
1991 2.057  100.9 0.027  1.3 -0.045 -2.2 2.039 
1993 1.761 98.6 0.033  1.8 -0.008 -0.4 1.786 
1995 1.537  100.6 0.041  2.7 -0.051 -3.3 1.528 
1998 3.696  100.3 0.045  1.2 -0.055 -1.5 3.686 
2000 3.832 98.5 0.041  1.0  0.018  0.5  3.890 
2002 2.488 98.3 0.043  1.7  0.000  0.0  2.531 
        
Gender of Household head 
1991 2.245  110.1 0.025  1.2 -0.231  -11.3 2.039 
1993 1.788  100.1 0.030  1.7 -0.032 -1.8 1.786 
1995 1.524 99.7 0.031  2.0 -0.027 -1.7 1.528 
1998 3.679 99.8 0.038  1.0 -0.031 -0.8 3.686 
2000 3.861 99.2 0.023  0.6  0.006  0.2  3.890 
2002 2.512 99.2 0.019  0.8  0.000  0.0  2.531 
Source: our calculations from SHIW-HA figures. 
(1) The three areas of residence are: Northern Italy, Central Italy, Southern Italy and the Islands. 
(2) The three levels of education of household heads are: no formal education  or primary school; middle 
school or high school; university degree. 
(3) The five levels of work status of household heads are: blue-collar worker or office worker; senior official 
or manager; self-employed; pensioner; other (first-job seeker, unemployed, housewife, etc.). 
(4) The four levels of age classes are less than 34, from 35 to 44, from 45 to 54, from 55 to 64, from 65 to 74 
and more than 74. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper estimates an “augmented” measure of net worth including social security wealth, and it 
examines the composition and distribution of this augmented wealth among Italian households 
during the period 1991-2002. The main aim of this analysis is to evaluate the impact of the 
structural pension reforms introduced over the last decade on the distribution of total wealth. Our 
evidence is based on six cross-sections of the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002). 
The main results presented in this study are the following: 
•  Augmented wealth was found to have remained roughly constant during the last decade as 
the combined result of two opposing factors, namely an increase in net worth (i.e. real and 
financial assets net of debts) and a stronger, parallel decline in social security wealth, due to 
the two main pension reforms introduced in 1992 and 1995.  
•  The rise of net worth is largely attributable to an increase in home-ownership and dwelling 
size, a rise in house prices, a shift in household portfolios towards risk-bearing assets, and 
the increase in stock market prices that marked the late 1990s.  
•  The key factors underlying the reduction in social security wealth were the abolition of 
indexation of pensions to real wages growth after 1991, which affected all current and future 
pensioners, together with the changes made to the computation of pension benefits, which 
mainly affected young workers and the self-employed. 
•  As a result of these trends the shares of the two components of wealth changes dramatically 
in different direction: while in 1991 the share of social security wealth accounted for about 
one half of total wealth, at the end of the period it amounted to less than one third. This 
reduction affected all the households regardless their position in the distribution of total 
wealth. 
•  After rising steeply at the beginning of the 1990s, augmented wealth inequality levelled off 
during the second part of the period. The major contribution to the initial rise came from 
social security wealth, the distribution of which, although less unequal than the distribution 
of real and financial wealth, widened during the first half of the decade at a much faster 
pace. In fact, the pension reforms implemented over the last decade seem to have reduced 
the equalising effect of social security wealth on augmented wealth. 
•  Wealth Inequality by age class show different time patterns. While the variability of net 
worth among young households tends to decrease, the opposite occurs among middle-aged 
and the elderly households, probably given by the increasing propensity of these subgroups   35
to subscribe risky financial assets. Social security wealth inequality shows an increasing 
trend for all age classes, and is particularly marked among young households. 
•  The Gini decomposition by wealth factor shows that, while in 1991 total wealth inequality 
basically depended on both real assets and social security wealth, a different picture 
emerged a decade later, where real assets maintained a primary role and the relative 
contribution of socal security wealth became smaller. Another component of total wealth, 
the financial one, acquired a considerable weight in explaining total variability. 
•  The results of the decomposition of inequality into different population subgroups sorted by 
some socio-demographic categories (area of residence, education, work status, age and 
gender) show that overall inequality in total wealth is mainly accounted for the within-
component, while the between-component seems to play a marginal role. This result holds 
for all our partitioning. 
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Workers in 1991 and workers with 
at least 15 year of contribution in 
1992 
Workers with less than 15 years of 
contribution in 1992 
Workers entered in the labour 
market after 1995 
The pension formula is: 
 




W1 and W2 are pensionable 
earnings 
N1 and N2 are years of 
contributions 
 
For contribution before 1992 W1 is 
the average of the last five and ten 
years respectively for dependent 
and self employed. 
 
For contribution after 1992 W2 is 
the average of the last 10 and 15 
years respectively for dependent 
and self employed 
 
 
The contribution rate is 27% of 
earnings for dependent workers 
and 12% for the self employed in 
1991. 
The pension formula is: 
 








W1 and W2 are pensionable 
earnings; N1 and N2 are years of 
contributions 
 
For contribution before 1992 W1 is 
the average of the last five and ten 
years respectively for dependent 
and self employed. 
 
For contribution after 1992 W2 is 
the average wage of the number of 
years progressively increasing. 
Past wages are indexed by a rate of 
1% each year. 
 
The contribution rate is 33% of 
earnings for dependent workers 
and 20% for the self employed 
The pension formula is: 
 




k is an almost actuarially fair 
transformation coefficient which 
ranges from 0.472 at the age of 57 
to 0.614 at the age of 65. 
Coefficient are adjusted every ten 
years in order to take into account 
of increased longevity. 
 
MC is the sum of contribution 
accrued during the whole working 
life and capitalized at the rate of 
growth of nominal Gdp up to a 




The contribution rate is 33% of 
earnings for dependent workers 
and 20% for the self employed. 
 